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KOREA
PUSAN URBAN MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2801-K0)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This Projest Completion Report (PCR) summarizes the experience with
the Pusan Urban Management Project, for which Loan 2801-KO in the amount of US$50
million was approved on April 28, 1987. The Borrower was the Pusan City
Goverrument, with the guarantee of the Republic of Korea. Due to the sector-type
design of the project, disbursement of the Bank loan was very rapid, and the loan
was closed on August 31, 1989, 16 months before the original closing date of
December 31, 1990. The last disbursement was made on the closing date.
The PCR (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) was prepared
by the Infrastructure Operationi Division of the Asia Regional Office. The
Government did not provide Part II.
Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's project
supervision mission in June 1990 and was based, inter alia, on the Staff
Appraisal Report, the Loan and Guarantee Agreements, supervision reports,
correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.
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KOREA
PUSAN URBAN MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2801-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATION SUMMARY
i. Obiectives. During 1970-86, Pusan's population doubled to more than
3.5 million. The rapid population growth coupled with accelerated economic
development and rising incomes contributed to an increased demand for services.
However, the city's ability to finance such investments was threatened by its
serious financial constraints, largely caused by the construction of a subway
with short-term financing. Although the Pusan City Government (PCC) decided to
scale down its subway construction plans, it still needed to address its
institutional weaknesses which had resulted in poor investment planning and
financial management. The Pusan Urban Management Project was intended to improve
the city's urban management and finances by (a) improving the city's
organization and coordination; (b) strengthening project selection and investment
planning; (c) coordinating and optimizing transportation planning and
investments, the city's most critical problem; (d) strengthening the city's
financial, planning and managerial systems; and (e) supporting priority
investments and balanced development cf the city.
ii. The project supported priority investments included in PCG7s 1987-89
Investment Plan as well as implementation of a Policy Statement and Institutional
Development Program (PSIDP) approved by PCG in March 1987. Investments for
project financing emphasized small works complementing the benefits of existing
infrastructure and were selected on the basis of agreed evaluation criteria.
Subprojects included: construction and improa,cment of priority roads;
construction of drainage, flood protection and sewerage works; construction of
embankivent and steep slope protection works; improvement and expansion of city
services (markets, community facilities, etc.); implementation of a
Transportation Management System (TSM) for the provision of low-cost
transportation improvements; and provision of equipment and materials.
iii. The PSIDP included an action plan to strengthen PCG's management,
organization and finances. It was expected to: consolidate all investment
planning; improve the overall transportation system; establish an annual
investmient plan, long-term financial plan and performance monitoring system;
strengthen project evaluation; and complete studies identifying mechanisms by
which to improve the city's financial management and cash resources.
iv. Implementation Experience. The project loan was fully disbursed as
of August 31, 1989, 16 months earlier than expected. All aspects of the project
were completed satisfactorily. The PSIDP was carried out as agreed. Most of the
institutional changes were made during the first project year and were followed
up by the provision of technical assistance and training to augment or strengthen
staff capabilities in newly-introduced areas like computer-based project
evaluation and financial planning. Introduction of a computerized Long-Term
- iii -
Financial Plan was, however, delayed by the need to make significant changes in
the original design of the system due to the adoption in May 1988 of a
decentralized system of fiscal responsibility within PCG which reassigned some
taxes and expenses from the general city accounts to 11 administrative districts
within the city.
v. With respect to investments, project funds were used to finance
hundreds of subprojects distributed throughout the city, most of which were small
but of high priority. About 71% of project investments went to road and highway
improvements, 11% to drainage, sewerage and flood control, 8% to embankment and
slope protection, 7% to community facilities and about 3% to traffic improvement
measures. The subsectoral allocations were generally as envisioned at appraisal.
vi. Hgesl. The Project investments improved living conditions in
Pusan. Institutionally, the project helped to streamline and strengthen the city
administration, particularly in financial management and investment evaluation,
transport investment planning, public transport and traffic management, and water
supply and sewerage services. Several of the institutional improvements have
been crucial to the city's financial health: (a) the city's computerized budget
and financial model developed with Bank support during project preparation is
assisting PCG with general financial management and planning; (b) the computer-
based investment plan and long-term financial projections called for under the
project are used for the preparation of published annual plans which are
regularly updated as a management tool for senior city officials; (c) formation
of a Project Evaluation Division to assess investments on the basis of sound
economic principles improved investment planning, thus benefitting the city's
long-term financial health and rational development; and (d) subsidies for city-
run public enterprises were significantly decreased, and a project study led to
the establishment of a Pusan Regional Development Fund to finance projects
through loans rather than grants. Furthermore, since Pusan shared its experience
in implementing project reforms with other major cities in Korea, the project
benefitted metropolitan areas countrywide.
vii. At project completion, PCG's financial condition had improved due to
the transfer in mid-1988 of the city's subway assets and liabilities to a
national government corporation. Partly due to institutional improvements made
under the project, Pusan continues to show adequate financial performance as
shown by several key indicators. General Revenue has been buoyant, growing at
an annual rate of 22% over the period 1986 and 1989. The proportion of self-
generated revenue has stayed approximately constant at a high level of 84%. The
total taxes and fees collected for the combined Special Accounts (for city-owned
public corporations, which were heavily subsidized prior to the project) has
increased at 6% p.a. over the same period, reflecting improved cost recovery.
Perhaps most important, outstanding debt has been reduced to less than half the
burdensome level of 1986 (from W 1.4 trillion to W 0.6 trillion).
viii. The actual project cost was W 127.4 billion, 23% lower than the cost
expected at appraisal due to changes in exchange rates. Subproject selection
criteria were agreed to with the city and a minimum rate of return of 12% was
required for all Bank-financed investments. The Economic Rate of Return
calculated for about two thirds of the subprojects slated for the first year was
estimated at 24%. Due to the numezous small investments, smaller than originally
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expected, which were financed under the project, the rates of return were not
recalculated for the PCR.
ix. Sustainability. The city's improved financial position hZ'a confirmed
the value of the institutional, financial and management improvements introduced
under the project. PCG has recognized the value of these improvements by
maintaining the changes and even improving on them as circumstances warranted.
For example, PCG used the experience it gained under the project with
computerization and the preparation of financial projections to computerize a
much larger financial planning model. It is now highly unlikely that the city
would abandon the factors which contributed to its improved municipal managemnent
and sound development path for its former practices. The city's strengthened
financial position will also ensure that the physical improvements introduced
under the project are maintained and expanded in parallel with further growth and
still rising demand for city services.
x. Findings and Lessons Learned. The project's success reflected PCG's
firm commitment to improving city management. The following lessons were learned
under the project. First, institutionally-focused projects, despite their lack
of a quantifiable economic return, are sometimes more helpful to a borrower than
investment projects by addressing core issues that affect many sectors and
constrain overall development. Second, for a multisectoral project with a wide
agenda, the Bank should be prepared to fieid a larger than normal supervision
team, with wider skill ranges, to oversee the project's diverse aspects. Third,
project staff need to be flexible and imaginative in handling their tasks. In
this project, Bank staff helped PCG to redefine its needs and, during
implementation, assisted PCG staff by providing training and hands-on assistance
to local staff, by sending them relevant publications and by identifying training
opportunities and arranging for both local and foreign consultants to give
seminars and assist in specific areas. A related lesson is that, in areas where
English is not generally spoken, greater reliance should be placed on well-
qualified local consultants whose language ability renders them more effective
than foreign consultants. Finally, multisectoral projects addressing a range of
issues can be successfully implemented when clearly justified and fully supported
by the borrower.
KOREA
PUSAN URBAN MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2801-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART I: BANK REVIEW OF THE PROJECT
Project Identity
- Project Name: Pusan Urban Management Project
- Loan Number: Loan 2801-KO
- RVP Unit: Asia
- Country: Republic of Korea
- Sector: Urban
- Subsector: Urban Management
Background
1. Urbanization throughout Korea has progressed very rapidly, placing
heavy demands on the major cities. In 1986, when the Pusan Urban Management
Project eas identified, Pusan's population had doubled since 1970 to more than
3.5 miliLon, making it the second largest city in Korea. This rapid population
growth coupled with accelerated economic development and rising incomes
contrib-ted to an increased demand for services, particularly in sewage
treatment, water supply and urban transport, and in 1983-86 investments averaged
US$400 million p.a. However, the city's ability to finance such investments was
increasingly threatened by its serious financial constraints largely caused by
the construction of a subway with short-term financing. With annual debt service
payments averaging about US$120 million and continuing capital expenditures,
Pusan faced serious cash flow problems. As a result, a large number of priority
investments had to be postponed.
2. The city's financial problems were aggravated by declining tax
revenues due to a slowdown in real estate transactions (the main source of
taxes), poor investment planning, and the loss of industries to outlying areas.
A review of Pusan's financial position at the time highlighted the following:
(a) the city government had relied increasingly on debt financing, with borrowing
growing by 69% p.a. during 1981-84 while non-borrowed resources had increased at
only 32% p.a.; (b) debt outstanding had grown by 105% p.a. during the same
period; (c) debt servicing costs, which had increased at a rate of 96% p.a., were
large and increased the share of Pusan's total expenditures; (d) transportation
investment including the subway had taken a growing share of capital expenditures
(subway construction costs accounted for 45% to 55% of total capital expenditures
during 1981-84); and (e) subway ridership was far below original estimates
(90,000/day vs. 350,000/day) resulting in the need for a substantial operating
subsidy from the city.
3. Although subway construction was to be indefinitely postponed after
completion of the first line in early 1988, the Pusan City Government (PCG) still
needed to establish an institutional framework for investment planning and
management to cope with its financial problems, manage its urban services, and
maintain a balanced development path.
4. At the time of project identification, P(U was not fully aware of the
scope of its financial problems due to deficiencies in its financial and
management information systems. It initially requested Bank assistance in
financing construction of an expressway to help relieve the city's serious
traffic problems. However, a review of city accounts by Bank staff and
discussions with city management indicated Pusan's even more pressing need for
long-term funds for priority infrastructure investments and, more important, a
financial restructuring program, the key ingredients of which' would be:
(a) preparation of a medium- to long-term financial plan and improved financial
management through revised accounting practices and budgeting processes;
(b) increased revenue generation by establishing pricing policies for city
services to fully reflect costs and by undertaking a tax performance audit; and
(c) improved investment planning and project evaluation through the development
and application of standardized economic, financial and technical criteria for
the selection of investmfents.
5. The project identified, though comprising only 4% of the city's
borrowing needs in 1987-90, was expected to relieve some of the city's pressing
financial needs (many short-term) through the provision of long-term funds for
investments and, through various institutional reforms, to improve lenders'
perceptions of the city's creditworthiness. The project conformed with the
Bank's lending strategy for Korea's urban sector which was to support high
priority investments included in Government's development plans and, through
these operations, to improve the efficiency of sector institutions.
Objectives and Description
6. The project's general objective was to improve the city's urban
management and finances. Its specific aims were to: (a) improve the city's
organization and coordination; (b) strengthen project selection and investment
planning; (c) coordinate and oDtimize transportation planning and investments,
the city's most critical problem; (d) strengthen the city's financial, planning
and managerial systems; and (e) support priority investments and the balanced
development of the city.
7. The project supported priority investments included in PCGGs 1987-89
Investment Plan as well as implementation of a Policy Statement and Institutional
Development Program (PSIDP) approved by PCG in March 1987. Investments for
project financing emphasized small works complementing the benefits of existing
infrastructure and were selected on the basis of agreed evaluation criteria.
Subprojects included: (a) construction and improvements of priority roads
(expansion, rehabilitation, paving); (b) construction of drainage, flood
protection and sewerage works; (c) construction of embankment and steep slope
protection works; (d) improvements and expansion of Pusan City's services
(markets, landfill, fire protection and community facilities); (e) implementation
of Transportation System Management (TSM) for the provision of low-cost
transportation improvements; and (f) provision of equipment and materials.
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8. The PSIDP included strengthening of PCG's management, organization
and finances, with a major reorganization of the city administration to address
its main institutional constraints: a weak planning and policy-making
capability, overlapping responsibilities, and dispersed and uncoordinated
management of urban transport, With the aims of consolidating all investment
planning, improving the overall transportation system, establishing an arnual
investment plan, long-term financial plan and performance monitoring system,
strengthening project evaluation and completing studies for the implementation
of mechanisms to improve cost recovery and integrate the city's financial
management and cash resources, the PSIDP committed PCG to:
(a) establish a new Bureau of Transportation and Tourism to consolidate
planning of all transportation systems and investments;
(b) establish a Transportation System Management unit to implement small
but important improvements to optimize the capacity of the existing
transport system;
(e) establish joint management of water and sewerage services to improve
the efficiency, coordination and financing of these services;
(d) establish a new Regional Development Division to review and evalua
te large investments and improve the guidelines for prioritizing
small projects;
(e) establish a long-term planning and management information system,
including performance monitoring of PCG's General Account (GA) (for
the ten main administrative bureaus which were generally well run)
and Special Accounts (SAs) (city-owned public corporations for water
supply, the subway, toll roads, etc., which had shown varying
financial performance);
(f) establish a yearly review of the city's Investment Plan to set
priorities and maintain a satisfactory financial position;
(g) update at least annually and submit to the Bank for review, a Long-
Term Financial Plan (LTFP) and Investment Plan (which would includ
e a list of subprojects proposed for Bank financing). The LTFP,
which was dleveloped uring project preparation and simulated in
microcomputers, was intended to assist PCG in improving its
financial planning and management. The computer model provided
detailed projections for total city finances, as well as
consolidated results and monitoring indicators for management use;
(h) expand existing in-house training programs to provide training in
transportation management, urban planning, computer applications,
budgeting and financial planning; and
(i) complete studies for establishment of a Pusan Fund Management
Special Account (PFMSA) to foster cost recovery, integrated
financial management and better use of the city's cash resources.
-4-
Design and Organization
9. The project was well designed by supporting needed investments in
priority sectors while also addressing the city's need for a rationalized
organizational structure, a sound system of financial management and an
investment planning capability based on economic criteria. The policy and
institutional changes fostered by the project were important to the city's
continued development and financial health. Projections made during project
preparation indicated that without the project the city would have had a cash
deficit of some US$300 million during 1987-90 and limited external borrowing
possibilities due to its shaky financial structure.
10. On the investment side, the project's emphasis on improving road
infrastructure, transport and traffic management (which together received 74% of
project expenditures) addressed the city's underdeveloped road network (indicated
by a pre-project road-to-land-area ratio of 10.6%, as opposed to 15.3% in Seoul
and 14.6% in Incheon), the relatively low standard of the roads that did exist
(with only 53% paved, compared to more than 70% in Seoul and Incheon), and
chronic traffic congestion due to rising traffic levels and an inadequately
ir.tegrated public transport network. Project investments in road improvements
and extensions, the construction of transit centers for bus-subway integration,
and traffic management improvements accomplished through the TSM program were
therefore important in improving living standards in the city.
11. The project's sector-type approach, with subprojects elected on the
basis of agreed evaluation criteria, promoted efficient project implementation
and a rapid flow of funds to PCG. The Investment Planning Department and Project
Evaluation Division established for the project carried out their investment
screening duties satisfactorily and were instrumental in helping to improve the
city's financial condition. The project's overall organizational arrangements,
witl. the Assistant Mayor for Planning and Management coordinating studies,
planning, and the institutional development program, the Bureau of Construction
-;upervising major works, and the County Engineering Offices supervising minor
works, proved satisfactory.
Implementation
12. The project loan was fully disbursed as of August 31, 1989,
significantly faster than the projected loan closing date of December 31, 1990.
All aspects of the project were completed satisfactorily. The PSIDP was carried
out as agreed, with most of the institutional changes made during the first
project year (see Part III, Table 5.2). PCG followed up on the institutional,
financial and procedural changes introduced under the PSIDP by seeking technical
assistance to augment or strengthen staff capabilities, particularly for the
introduction of computer-based project evaluation and financial planning, and
provided staff with special training opportunities where necessary. Introduction
of the computerized Long-Term Financial Plan was, however, delayed by the need
to make significant changes in the original computer program due to the
introduction of local autonomy in May 1988 and the consequent reassignment of PCG
taxes and expenses among the city's central government and 11 administrative
districts.
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13. With respect to investments, project funds were used to finance
hundreds of subprojects distributel t'Liroughout the city, most of which were small
but of high priority. About 71% of project investments went to road and highway
improvements, 11% went to drainage, sewerage and flood control, 8% went to
embankment and slope protection, 7% to community facilities and about 3% to
traffic improvement measures. The subsectoral allocations were generally as
envisioned at appraisal.
14. The subprojects executed were much smaller than originally estimated.
At appraisal, it was expected that international competitive bidding would be
used for contracts worth over US$5 million (estimated to comprise about 28% of
all project civil works), with local competitive bidding used for subprojects
worth between US$1 million and US$5 million. However, most subprojects cost less
than US$1 million since, as had been noted at appraisal, the city placed priority
on small, complementary works to complete the benefits of existing
infrastructure.
Project Results
15. The project improved living conditions in Pusan through the
implementation of many, small investments which brought benefits to the
neighborhood level. For example, the TSM improvements were found to be effective
in enhancing the efficiency of the transport system, and in the case of one road
artery, increasing the traffic speed from about 11 km/h in 1986 to 30 km/h in
1990.
16. Institutionally, the project helped to streamline and strengthen the
city administration, particularly in overall financial management and investment
evaluation, transport investment planning, public transport and traffic
management, and water supply and sewerage services. Consultants engaged both
under the project and directly by the Bank provided the city with expert advice
that it normally would not have sought.
17. Several of the institutional improvements are particularly important
to the city's financial health. First, the city's computerized budget and
financial model developed with Bank support during project preparation is
assisting PCG with general financial management and planning. Second, the
computer-based investment plan and long-term financial projections called for
under the project are now used for the preparation of published annual plans
which are regularly updated as a management tool for senior city officials.
Third, formation of the Project Evaluation Division (PED) to assess investments
on the basis of sound economic principles has improved investment planning, thus
benefitting the city's long-term financial health and rational development. For
example, in 1988, only 26% of the 337 projects submitted for review were found
acceptable, and the remainder were postponed or canceled. Finally, subsidies for
the Special Accounts have been significantly decreased, cost recovery by the
three largest Special Accounts has improved, and the city (prompted by the
project's study of a possible Pusan Fund Management Special Account) has
established a Pusan Regional Development Fund to finance projects through loans
rather than grants. Furthermore, sirnce Pusan was encouraged to share its
experience in implementing project reforms with other major cities in Korea, the
project presumably benefitted metropolitan areas countrywide.
-6-
18. By the time of project completion, PCG's financial condition had
improved due to the transfer in mid-1988 of the city's subway assets and
liabilities from one of the Special Accounts (continually in deficit and
subsidized by PCG) to a corporation largely owned by the National Railroad
Corporation and thus supported by central government funding. Pusan continues
to show adequate financial performance as shown by some key indicators. General
Revenue has been buoyant, growing at an annual rate of 22% over the period 1986
and 1989. The proportion of self-generated revenue has stayed approximately
constant at a high level of 84%. The combined Special Accounts revenues have
actually declined but only di..e to reduced borrowing. The total taxes and fees
collected for the combined Special Accounts has increased at 6% p.a. over the
same period reflecting improved cost recovery. Perhaps most important,
outstanding debt has been reduced to less than half the burdensome level of 1986
(from W 1.4 trillion to W 0.6 trillion).
19. At completion, the project cost was W 127.4 billion, 24% lower than
the cost expected at appraisal due to the appreciation of the won during the
project period (see Part III, Table 4). The overall scope of project investments
was essentially determined by the value of the Bank loan in won terms, with PCG
expected to match the Bank's contribution on a 3-to-1 basis. With an exchange
rate of W 860 to the U.S. dollar at the time of project approval, the Bank's
US$50 million equivalent loan was worth about W 43 billion, implying a PCG
contribution of about W 124 billion anid a total project cost of W 167 billion.
However, with the appreciation of the won to about W 730 to the U.S. dollar in
1988 (15% appreciation) and to W 670 in 1989 (22% appreciation compared to 1987),
the value of the Bank loan declined, causing the overall scope of investments and
project cost to also contract. The Bank loan of US$50 million was fully
disbursed against the foreign exchange cost of subprojects qualifying for Bank
financing. The remaining costs were covered by PCG.
20. Subproject selection criteria were agreed to with the city and a
minimum rate of return of 12% was required for all Bank-financed investments.
The Economic Rate of Return calculated for about two thirds of the subprojects
slated for the first year was estimated at 24%. Due to the numerous small
investments, smaller than originally expected, which were financed under the
project, the rates of return were not recalculated for the PCR.
Susta.nability
21. The city's Improved financial position has confirmed the value of the
institutional, financial and management improvements introduced under the
project. PCG has recognized the value of these improvements by maintaining the
changes and even improving on them as circumstances warranted. For example, when
greater autonomy was introduced in the city administration, the city managers
were keen to have a consultant assist them in revamping the computerized
financial model originally developed for the project. It is now highly unlikely
that the city will abandon the factors which contriDuted to its improved
municipal management and sound development path for the former practices, which
had made its financial position precarious and its administrative structure
unwieldy and uncoordinated.
22. The city's strengthened financial position will also ensure that the
physical improvements introduced under the project are maintained and expanded
in parallel with further growth and still rising demand for city services.
Bank Performance
23. The Bank's role in the project was perhaps most important during the
identification and preparation phases. At identification, Bank staff recognized
that the management tools available to the city administration were no longer
adequate to deal with the city's rapid physical development and complex financial
structure, and were able to assist the city officials to identify how they might
better deal with the major financial and administrative demands being placed on
them. In particular, Bank technical specialists, with expertise in financial
analysis, computer technology and transport planning, were able to provide
valuable advice in their fields.
24. During project implementation, the Bank continued to provide
technical advice on issues that arose, particularly regarding computerization of
financial and investment planning and the selection of consultants to assist PCG
with emerging problems. For example, Bank staff helped train PED staff in use
of the financial model, arranged for a FED staff member to attend a Public
Expenditure Programming and Management Course given by the Bank's Economic
Development Institute, hired consultants at its own expense to conduct a seminar
for PED staff in the economic evaluation of proposed investments and to assist
FED in gathering data and updating financial projections, and assisted in the
conversion of the computer model into Hangul. However, the smooth progress of
implementation, reflecting PCG's commitment to the project, required
comparatively little direct project supervision by Bank staff in the field,
although project supervision from headquarters was a continuing process through
review of project reports and communications with PCG.
25. The following lessons were learned under the project:
(a) Institutionally-focused projects, despite their lack of a
quantifiable economic return, are sometimes more helpful to a
borrower than investment projects, even with relatively high
economic returns, by addressing core issues that affect many sectors
and constrain overall development. In the case of this project, the
skills transferred and institutional improvements made under the
project were of far greater value to Pusan's overall development
than the urban transport project originally requested.
(b) For a multisectoral project with a wide agenda, the Bank should be
prepared to field a larger than normal supervision team with wider
skill ranges to oversee the project's diverse aspects. Although
implementation of the Pusan project was satisfactory, additional
time spent on supervising the project's non-financial components
might have brought about more significant institutional improvements
in sectors like transport and water supply.
(c) Project staff need to be flexible and imaginative in handling their
tasks. In this project, staff showed both qualities, first, at
project identification and preparation by helping PCG to redefine
its needs and, second, during implementation, when skills in
computerization, financial planning and investment analysis had to
be transferred to a large number of staff, who did not speak
English. Bank staff tackled this problem from various directions,
by providing training and hands-on assistance to local staff,
sending them relevant Bank publications and identifying training
opportunities at the Bank's Economic Development Institute, and
arranging for both local and foreign consultants to give seminars
and assist project staff in specific areas.
(d) In areas where English is not generally spoken, greater reliance
should be placed on well-qualified local consultants whose language
ability renders them more effective than foreign consultants. For
this project, a local computer expert provided valuable assistance
to PCG in adapting its financial computer model when the city's
administrative structure was decentralized.
(e) Multisectoral projects addressing a range of issues (so called
"Christmas tree" projects) can be successfully implemented when
clearly justified and fully supported by the borrower. The Urban
Management Project, comprising many small but high-priority
activities, succeeded because of PCG's concerted implementation
efforts.
Borrower Performance
26. As just indicated, PCG's performance was very good throughout project
preparation and implementation. Its staff accelerated the process of project
preparation by readily providing the information requested and it continued to
show enthusiasm during project implementation. PCG's compliance with Loan
Agreement covenants was satisfactory (see Part III, Table 5.1), and its rapidly
growing te :hnical capabilities and experience were demonstrated by its efficient
project execution and faster than expected project completion. It is
particularly revealing that PCG saw the project, not as an end in itself, but as
a means of learning valuable skills that could be applied in other contexts where
needed. It therefore used the experience it gained under the project with
computerization and the preparation of financial projections to computerize
another, much larger financial planning model, called the PCG Model. This is an
example of how the development process is supposed to work.
Project Relationships
27. The good working relatior,ship developed between PCG and the Bank in
the course of two previous Bank-supported projects (Pusan Port, Ln. 2726-KO and
Water Supply II, Ln. 2350-KO) cortinued under this project and facilitated rapid
project preparation and implementation. To some degree, it also contributed to
the project's success in introducing major organizational changes and wide-spread
use of new technologies and planning practices. Some changes, like that in the
water and sewerage sector, had been identified and discussed informally in the
course of the previous project, so that the groundwork had been laid for the
organizational change introduced under the Urban Management Project. For other
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changes, like the computerization of financial and planning systems, PCG and Bank
staff worked together with project consultants in designing, implementing and
adapting the system to the city's requirements.
Consulting Services
28. Consultants were engaged under the project (a) to carry out the TSM
program (a Transportation Planner, Transport Economist, two TSM Engineers and a
Public Transport Planner to carry out short-term training courses for staff from
various transport-related city agencies), (b) to assess requirements for PCG's
computerization and provide training in the preparation and use of financial
projections and project evaluation, and (c) to undertake the Pusan Special
Account Fund Many ement Study. The performance of these consultants was
satisfactory.
29. Project civil works contractors, all Korean, performed
satisfactorily, and the equipment suppliers, who were both local and foreign,
generally performed satisfactorily and delivered equipment on time.
Project Documentation and Data
30. Project documentation was generally adequate. The availability of
data for project monitoring was satisfactory: the system of computerized
financial projections for Pusan, which was developed under the project, was used
routinely and facilitated monitoring of PCG's performance.
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PART II: BORROWER EVIEW OF THE PROJECT
Not Available.
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PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
Table 1. Related Bank Loans
Loan Title Purpose Approval Status Comments
Pusan Port Project Provide quipment for 6/86 Satis- 8eing implemented by the
(Ln. 2726-KO) efficient handLing of factory Korean Maritime and Port
containers and improve Administration, with no
port management and direct involvement of the
financial control. Pusan City Government. Loan
closing expected by end-1992.
Second Water Supply To eliminate sea water 10/83 Completed Implementing agency: Korea
ProJect (Ln. 2350-KO) intrusion in the Water Resources Corporation.
Nakdong River delta by Pusan City receives about
constructing a 510-m half the water made available
barrage downstream of by the barrage. Under the
Pusan City. loan, the city agreed to use
its own resources to
construct an interceptor
sewer and water treatment
plant to divert industrial
and domestic wastes to
downstream of the barrage,
preventing contamination f
the barrage reservoir. Due to
the City's financial
constraints (which the Pusan
Urban Management Project
helped correct), interceptor
construction was delayed by
three years, but was
completed in 1990.
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ProTect Timetable
Table 2. Proiect Timetable
Date Date
Item Planned Actual
Identification 05/86
Preparation 06/86
Pre-appraisal 11/86
Appraisal The pre-appraisal mission was adequate for appraisal.
Loan Negotiations 01/06/87 02/09-13/87
Board Approval 11/87 04/28/87
Loan Signing 06/11/87
Loan Effectiveness 08/07/87
Project Completion 06/30/90 06/30/89
Loar. Closing 12/31/90 08/31/89
Issues Raised during the Proiect Cycle
Except for the change in the project's orientation from an urban transport to an
urban management project, which occurred in the course of project identification,
no major issues were raised during the project cycle.
- 13 -
Loan Diebursement
Table 3. Loan Disbursements
(US$ million)
Bank FY and Appraisal Actual as %
Semester Ending Estimate Actual of Appraisal
1988
12/31/87 6 11.95 199
06/30/88 13 29.96 230
1989
12/31/88 21 47.96 228
06/30/89 29 48.96 169
1990
12/31/89 39 50.00 128
06/30/90 47
1991
12/31/90 50
Date of Final Disbursement: August 31, 1989
Proj ect Implementation
Since the project took a sector-type approach to the investments supported, by
financing all projects meeting specified eligibility criteria, no implementation
plan for project works was prepared at appraisal. Implementation was expected
to take three years to complete, but in fact took only two years. Implementation
of the Policy Statement and Institutional Development Program was generally in
accordance with the timing included in the Loan Agreement (see Table 5 for
details).
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Project Costs and Financing
A. Project Costs
In terms of won, the project cost less than expected. This was due to the fact
that the overall scope of project investments was essentially determined by the
value of the Bank loan in won terms, with the Pusan City Government (PCG)
expected to match the Bank's contribution on a 3-to-1 basis. With an exchange
rate of W 860 to the U.S. dollar at the time of project approval, the Bank's
US$50 million equivalent loan was worth about W 43 billion, implying a PCO
contribution of about W 124 billion and a total project cost of W 167 billion.
However, with the appreciation of the won to ab',ut W 730 to the U.S. dollar in
1988 (15% appreciation) and to W 670 in 1989 (22% appreciation compared to 1987),
the value of the Bank loan declined, causing the overall scope of investments and
project cost, to also contract. The final project cost of W 127.4 billion was
about 17% lcss than the originally projected base cost and 24% less than the
projected total cost, including contingencies.
Table 4. Project Costs
Projected Actual
- - - - (W billion) - - - -
Roads and highways 107.4 88.1
Drainage, sewerage and flood control 12.9 12.4
Embankment and slope protection 11.4 12.7
Community facilities 11.4 7.7
Transportation system management 6.0 2.0
Transit centers 3.8 3.8
TSM technical assistance 0.8 0.7
Base cost 153.7 127.4
Physical contingencies 7.7
Price contingencies 5.4
Total Cost 166.8 127.4
B. Project Financing
Due to the proportional method of determining project financing, PCG provided
about 74% of project financing as originally envisioned.
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Proiect Results
Economic Impact. Subproject selection criteria were agreed to with the city and
a minimum rate of return of 12% was required for all Bank-financed investments.
The Economic Rate of Return calculated for about two thirds of the subprojects
slated for the first year was estimated at 24%. Due to the numerous small
investments, smaller than originally expected, which were financed under the
project, the rates of return were not recalculated for the PCR.
Financial Impact. By the time of project completion, PCG's financial condition
had improved due to the transfer in mid-1988 of the city's subway assets and
liabilities from one of the Special Accounts (continually in deficit and
subsidized by PCG) to a corporation largely owned by the National Railroad
Corporation and thus supported by central government funding. Pusan continues
to show adequate financial performance as shown by some key indicators. General
Revenue has been buoyant, growing at an annual rate of 22% over the period 1986
and 1989, compared to 19% p.a. in 1983-85. The proportion of self-generated
revenue has stayed approximately constant at a high level of 84%. The combined
Special Accounts revenues have actually declined, but only due to reduced
borrowing. The total taxes and fees collected for the combined Special Accounts
has increased at 6% p.a. over the same period reflecting improved cost recovery.
Perhaps most important, outstanding debt has been reduced to less than half the
burdensome level of 1986 (from W 1.4 trillion to W 0.6 trillion).
Studies
Study Purpose Status/Impact
Pusan Fund Management To consider Completed
Special Account Study establishment of a satisfactorily and
(PFMSA) PFMSA to secure better resulted in
management of the establishment of a
city's cash resources. Pu.,an Regional
The study identified a Development Fund to
means by which urban finance projects
service funds recovered through loans rather
through user charges than grants.
could provide financial
resources for other
projects and induce
cost recovery.
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Table 5.1. Status of Covenants
Section Activity Comments
3.03 Borrower to approve sub- Complied with.
projects in accordance with Project Evaluation
criteria agreed with the Bank. Unit reviewed all
medium and large
projects.
3.04 Borrower to review with the Complied with.
Bank annually the progress Reviews carried out in
achieved in implementing the August 1987, February
Policy Statement. The first 1988 and September
such review to take place not 1989.
later than December 1987.
3.06 Borrower to update its long- Complied with in
term financial plan at least September 1989, the
once every year, starting delay caused by the
March 1988. need to design a new
computer program for
the plan to account
for changed financial
arrangements
introduced with the
provision of local
autonomy to tl. city's
11 districts in May
1988.
3.07 Borrower to complete and Completed
furnish to the Bank by satisfactorily and
December 31, 1987, a study resulted in
assessing the need to establishment of a
establish a Pusan Fund Pusan Regional
Management Special Account to Development Fund to
improve management of finance projects
financial resources. through loans rather
than grants.
4.01 Borrower to send audited Complied with. Audit
financial statements and reports received for
Special Account and a separate 1987 and 1988.
opinion on Statement of
Expenditures, six months after
the end of the fiscal year.
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Table 5.2 Status of Policy Statement and Institutional DevelopDent Program
Activity Comments
Create and staff Bureau of Trans- New Bureau established by May 1988
portation and Tourism by end-1987. and operating satisfactorily.
Establish Traffic Planning Operating by May 1988, with
Division for Transportation System support of consultants.
Management by end-1987.
Establish integrated Water and Carried out as planned.
Sewerage Bureau by end-1988.
Phase out subsidies for Special Subsidies significantly reduced
Accounts starting in 1988. and cost recovery by three largest
Special Accounts improved.
By end-1987, study organization, Study completed and Pusan Regional
financing and legal changes to Development Fund established to
establish Pusan Fund Management finance investments through loans
Special Account to improve city rather than grants.
management of cash resources.
Establish by end-1987 a Regional Project Evaluation Division
Development Division to review and established and satisfactorily
evaluate large investments (above staffed by May 1988. Additional
W 5 billion each) and improve staff training provided.
guidelines for prioritizing small Guidelines for investment
investments. evaluation issued to central and
district authorities.
Establish a computerized long-term Complied with in September 1989,
planning and management informa- the delay caused by the need to
tion system (MIS), including design new computer programs for
performance monitoring, by end- the LTFP and MIS to account for
1987 and annually update Long-Term changed financial and
Financial Plan (LTFP). organizational arrangements
introduced with the provision of
local autonomy to the city's 11
districts in May 1988.
Review and update Investment Plan Plan reviewed and updated in 1988
annually. and 1989.
Provide training in transportation Training provided in TSM, computer
management, urban planning, applications, financial
computer applications, budgeting projections, and investment
and financial planning. evaluation.
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Table 6. Use of Bank Resources
A. Staff Inputs
Stages of Project Cycle HQ. Field Total
staff-weeks-
Through Appraisal 28 12 40
After Appraisal to Board Approval 10 3 13
After Board Approval to Effectiveness 9 - 9
Supervision 23 6 29
TOTAL 70 21 91
B. Missions
Stage of Project Month/ Number of Days in Specialty Performance Type of
Cycle Year Persons Field Represented Rating Status 1/ Problems
Identification 01/86 1 2 Economist n.a.
03/86 1 2 Chief n.a.
Identification 05/86 2 2 Economist n.a.
Fin. Analyst
Preparation I 06/86 4 2 Economist n.a.
Fin. Analyst
Engineers (2)
Preappraisal 11/86 6 8 Economist n.a.
Fin. Analyst
Engineer (2)
Transp. Planner
Urban Planner
(NOTE: The Preappraisal mission was able to appraise the project.)
Post-Appraisal 03/87 4 4 F.Analysts (2) n.a.
Engineer (2)
Supervision I 06/87 2 2 Transp. Planner
Engineer
Supervision II 08/87 1 2 Fin. Analyst 1
Supervision III 01/88 3 2 Fin. Analyst 1
Engineer
Tran:sp. Planner
Supervision IV 05188 3 2 Fin. Analyst 1
Engineer
Water Engineer
Supervision V 10/88 3 2 Fin. Analyst 1
Economist
Engineer
Supervision VI 05/89 2 2 Economist I
Engineer
Supervision VII 09189 1 2 Economist 1
Supervision VIII 05/90 1 1 Economist 1
16 Rating refers to overall project status; 1 - no significant problems.
